Incentives to Corporate Governance Activism
This paper considers incentives faced by investors (financial institutions) to become actively involved in the governance of under-performing companies in their portfolio as recently proposed. By considering the private benefits and the costs of investor activism separately, it questions the conventional wisdom -based on simplistic agency theory - that share ownership is so widely held in the UK that such incentives are too weak for shareholder activism to be a rational basis of a system of corporate governance. It finds that in many cases, by contrast, these incentives would be very strong indeed if conflicts of interest could be avoided.
|Date of creation:||04 Jun 2003|
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- repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
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- Charkham, Jonathan & Simpson, Anne, 1999. "Fair Shares: The Future of Shareholder Power and Responsibility," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292142. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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