Effects of Strategic Behavior and Public Subsidies on Families' Savings and Long-Term Care Decisions
This study investigates the effects of Medicaid and strategic behavior on (1) the probability of entering a nursing home, (2) amounts of formal and informal care provided elderly persons in the community, and (3) asset accumulation. We find that Medicaid subsidies increase the probabilyt of entry into the nursing home and use of formal care of elderly who remain in the community. However, Medicaid subsidies have not "crowded out" informal care provided by relatives and friends of the elderly. Nor has Medicaid reduced wealth accumulation by the elderly. Overall, we find little empirical support for the hypothesis that caregiving by children is motivated by the prospect of receiving bequests from their parents.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in LONG-TERM CARE: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY SOLUTIONS. DEVELOPMENTS IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY, Vol. 5, Roland Eisen and Frank A. Sloan, eds. Boston: Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic, 1996, pages 45-78|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (919) 660-1800
Fax: (919) 684-8974
Web page: http://econ.duke.edu/
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:duk:dukeec:96-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Department of Economics Webmaster)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.