Tradable deficit permits: a way to ensure sub-national fiscal discipline?
This paper proposes a system of tradable deficit permits for implementing budgetary austerity at the local level. We evaluate the efficiency of the fiscal retrenchment allocation in a dynamic setting with a commitment problem. The way rights are allcated and traded on the market turns out to be decisive for the cost-effectiveness of the system. Indeed, the inability of the State to commit dynamically to a sharing rule of deficit rights generates perverse incentives which affect the local market. The market turns out to be ineffcient - with heterogeneous jurisdictions - unless the State allows local decision-makers to trade permits through time.
|Date of creation:||2007|
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- Böhringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2003.
"On the Design of Optimal Grandfathering Schemes for Emission Allowances,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
03-08, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Bohringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2005. "On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2041-2055, November.
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