Moneychangers and Commodity Money
We study the role played by coin experts, called moneychangers, in the metallic money system. To do that, we introduce intermediaries that can expertise and certify coins into the VeldeWeber and Wright’s (1999) model of commodity money with imperfectly recognizable coins. We show under which conditions buyers have their coins certified, how circulation by weight and circulation by tale equilibria are affected by moneychangers, and whether moneychangers increase welfare.
|Date of creation:||2006|
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- Ping He & Lixin Huang & Randall Wright, 2005. "Money And Banking In Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 637-670, 05.
- Gandal, Neil & Sussman, Nathan, 1997. "Asymmetric Information and Commodity Money: Tickling the Tolerance in Medieval France," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 440-57, November.
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