Economic Growth in a Two-Agent Economy
This paper presents a two-agent economy, in which each agent has a consumption-dependent time preference. The optimal dynamic paths of accumulation will tend to one of many possible steady states, depending on the location of the initial capital level. One of the main results of this model arises in comparison with single-agent models. More precisely, one possible instance of the model consists of a case in which the two agents are such that without interaction one would become “rich” and the other “poor”. However, since they share a single production unit, a potential poverty trap may become averted.
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- Rolf Mantel, 1995. "Why the Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Poorer," Working Papers 9, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 1995.
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- Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1997. "The Endogenous Determination of Time Preference," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 729-758.
- Azariadis, Costas & Stachurski, John, 2005.
Handbook of Economic Growth,
in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5
- Costas Aariadis & John Stachurski, 2004. "Poverty Traps," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 913, The University of Melbourne.
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- Boud, John III, 1990. "Recursive utility and the Ramsey problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 326-345, April.
- Olivier Jean Blanchard & Stanley Fischer, 1989. "Lectures on Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262022834.
- Michael Stern, 2006. "Endogenous time preference and optimal growth," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 49-70, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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