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Multinationals, R&D and productivity: Evidence for UK Manufacturing firms

Author

Listed:
  • Dolores Añon Higon

    () (ERI-CES)

  • Miguel Manjon Antolin

    () (Universidad Rovira i Virgili)

  • Juan A. Mañez

    () (ERI-CES)

Abstract

In this study we analyze multinationality (domestic-based firms vs. multinationals) and foreignness (foreign vs. domestic firms) effects in the returns of R&D to productivity. We follow a two-step strategy. In the first step, we consistently estimate firm’s productivity by GMM and numerically compute the sample distribution of the R&D returns. In the second step, we use stochastic dominance techniques to make inferences on the multinationality and foreignness effects. Results for a panel of UK manufacturing firms suggest that multinationality and foreignness effects operate in an opposite way: whilst the multinationality effect enhances R&D returns, the foreignness diminishes them.

Suggested Citation

  • Dolores Añon Higon & Miguel Manjon Antolin & Juan A. Mañez, 2010. "Multinationals, R&D and productivity: Evidence for UK Manufacturing firms," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 1110, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
  • Handle: RePEc:dbe:wpaper:1110
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    Cited by:

    1. Dolores Añón Higón & Miguel Manjón & Juan A. Máñez & Juan A. Sanchis-Llopis, 2014. "Does R&D Protect Smes From The Hardness Of The Cycle? Evidence From Spanish Smes (1990-2009)," Working Papers 1411, Department of Applied Economics II, Universidad de Valencia.
    2. Marco Vivarelli, 2016. "The middle income trap: a way out based on technological and structural change," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 159-193, August.
    3. Teixeira, Aurora A.C. & Tavares-Lehmann, Ana Teresa, 2014. "Human capital intensity in technology-based firms located in Portugal: Does foreign ownership matter?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 737-748.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    multinationals; foreignness; R&D; productivity;

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

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