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Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Infinite Horizon

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  • Lionel Wilner

    () (CREST)

Abstract

In infinite horizon, a credible durable-good monopolist may resort to intertemporal price discrimination. We provide an analytical characterization of his optimal price policy when consumers and the monopolist have different values for the trade because of distinct discount factors.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Lionel Wilner, 2011. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Infinite Horizon," Working Papers 2011-31, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2011-31
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 511-531, May.
    2. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    3. Larry M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Levine's Working Paper Archive 201, David K. Levine.
    4. Stephen W. Salant, 1989. "When is Inducing Self-Selection Suboptimal for a Monopolist?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 391-397.
    5. R. Preston Mcafee & Thomas Wiseman, 2008. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 317-331.
    6. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-149, April.
    7. Nancy L. Stokey, 1979. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 355-371.
    8. Michael Landsberger & Isaac Meilijson, 1985. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Sales Strategy under Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 424-430.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    intertemporal price discrimination; durable-good monopoly; nonlinear pricing; non-transferability;

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly

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