Modelling structural changes in the volatility process
The tension between cooperation and competition that characterizes many business " relationships is experimentally studied in a “pie”-creation game; value is created and" increased through cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. At the end, the player with the greater stake in the joint pie decides on the division of the pie. Three treatments of the pie-creation game are considered: in the first treatment, rivals create " the pie; in the second, non-rivals create the pie; finally, in the third, the pie is created by" subjects who do not know about the future pie-division. The data show that the competition for the right to split the pie biases behaviors towards defection when subjects play with their rival.
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- Cooper, Russell & DeJong, Douglas V. & Forsythe, Robert & Ross, Thomas W., 1996.
"Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 187-218, February.
- Cooper, R. & DeJong, D.W. & Ross, T.W., 1992. "Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Papers 36, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Thomas W. Ross, 1992. "Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Papers 0036, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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