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Aporte solidario al ingreso de trabajo (ASIT): una mejor alternativa contra la desigualdad

Author

Listed:
  • Andrés Hernando

    (Centro de Estudios Públicos, Santiago)

  • Estéfano Rubio

    (Centro de Estudios Públicos, Santiago)

Abstract

Este trabajo compara qué política es más efectiva para disminuir los índices de desigualdad, pobreza y pobreza extrema, si la gratuidad universal en la educación superior o un Aporte Solidario al Ingreso del Trabajo (ASIT). Mientras la primera permitiría disminuir el índice de Gini en tan sólo 1,3% (una reducción de 0,7 puntos), la última lo haría entre un 8 y un 9% (una reducción de entre 4,1 y 4,7 puntos); por otro lado, los resultados en pobreza son aún más llamativos, ésta podría reducirse desde un 14,4% hasta un 6,9% y la pobreza extrema desde un 4,5% a un 2,2% (asumiendo el escenario más conservador). Mientras que la gratuidad universal de la educación superior reduciría estas cifras a 12,8% y 4,0%, respectivamente. Todo ello asumiendo un costo equivalente entre ambas políticas. De igual forma el ASIT, que funciona como un crédito tributario al ingreso, genera incentivos para ingresar al mercado laboral formal, evita crear dependencia del sistema de protección social por parte de los beneficiados y no distorsiona de manera importante la decisión ocio-trabajo. Además una alternativa como esta va en línea con lo que realizan países desarrollados, quienes no realizan el grueso de su redistribución mediante prestaciones de servicios como vivienda, educación o salud, sino que a través de impuestos y transferencias monetarias. De este estudio se puede concluir que existen alternativas mucho más costo-efectivas en materia redistributiva que una política como la de gratuidad universal de la educación superior. El Aporte Solidario al Ingreso del Trabajo aquí presentado es un ejemplo de ello y que podría aportar a mejorar la calidad de vida de más de 3 millones y medio* de las personas de menores ingresos del país.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Hernando & Estéfano Rubio, 2015. "Aporte solidario al ingreso de trabajo (ASIT): una mejor alternativa contra la desigualdad," Puntos de Referencia 419, Centro de Estudios Públicos.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpt:wpaper:419
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    desigualdad; empleo; subsidio; políticas sociales; pobreza;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality

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