Contract Choice, Incentives, and Political Capture in the Public Sector
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
KeywordsContract choice; Cost reduction; Incentives; Public transit;
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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