A Welfare Comparison Of Private And Public Monopoly
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Other versions of this item:
- Roemer, John E. & Silvestre, Joaquim, 1992. "A welfare comparison of private and public monopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 67-81, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jovanovic, Dragan, 2012. "Partial Public Ownership and Managerial Incentives," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62039, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2009.
"Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc, 2009. "Contract choice, incentives and political capture in public transport services," UC3M Working papers. Economics we096641, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Corneo, Giacomo & Rob, Rafael, 2003. "Working in public and private firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1335-1352, August.
- De Donder, Philippe & Roemer, John E., 2009.
"Mixed oligopoly equilibria when firms' objectives are endogenous,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 414-423, May.
- Philippe De Donder & John E. Roemer, 2006. "Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms' Objectives Are Endogenous," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1581, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Philippe De Donder & John E. Roemer, 2006. "Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms' Objectives Are Endogenous," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000436, UCLA Department of Economics.
- De Donder, Philippe & Roemer, John E, 2006. "Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms' Objectives Are Endogenous," CEPR Discussion Papers 5900, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- De Donder, Philippe & Roemer, John E., 2006. "Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firms' Objectives are Endogenous," IDEI Working Papers 414, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- repec:bla:jindec:v:65:y:2017:i:1:p:1-38 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc, 2010. "Contract Choice, Incentives, and Political Capture in the Public Sector," CEPR Discussion Papers 8053, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hartley, Peter & Medlock III, Kenneth B., 2008. "A model of the operation and development of a National Oil Company," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 2459-2485, September.
- Zou, Liang, 1992. "Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-431, September.
More about this item
Keywordspublic sector ; monopolies ; trade unions;
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