Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information
We extend a simple version of the citizen candidates model (developed by Osborne-Slivinsky (1996) and Besley-Coate (1997)) to an asymmetric information setting, in which the type of a given individual is assumed to be private information. Focusing on a particular class of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we show that there exist two kinds of equilibria. In the first one, both non-median types become candidates and those equilibria generalize to any number of (potential) candidates. In the second one, only one of the non-median types chooses to become candidates for the election and those equilibria hold for a number of (potential) candidates at most equal to three. This is in sharp contrast with the complete information framework in which only the median type individuals stand for office when the entry cost is sufficiently low.
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- John Duggan, .
"Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP9, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
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- Banks, Jeffrey S., 1990. "A model of electoral competition with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 309-325, April.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
- Martin J. Osborne, 1995. "Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 261-301, May.
- repec:oup:qjecon:v:112:y:1997:i:1:p:85-114 is not listed on IDEAS
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