Social Europe: Dramatic Visions and Real Complexity
Many social policy reforms have been carried out in Europe in the last fifteen years. Most of these reforms are marginal. Often they are mutually inconsistent. Yet, something is changing in the European social policy landscape and not in the direction implied by the presence of a 'race to the bottom' in social welfare provision. There are no signs of convergence of social policy models across Europe. Further reforms will have to be respectful of the initial conditions, that is, they necessarily have to adapt to the various Social Europes. By imposing the same pattern of reforms to the different European social policy models there is a high risk of jeopardizing reform efforts altogether. An additional reason for not imposing a single European social policy model is that social policy reforms need to be comprehensive, hence they should necessarily work on country-specific institutional clusters. All this makes a strong case for maintaining EU-level decision-making on social policy reforms under unanimity rule. Majority voting on these issues is likely to involve strong pressures to harmonize institutions, while some countries will always be in a minority. One country may receive the worst of each welfare system and make the furthering and broadening of the scope of reforms even more difficult.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Orszag, Mike & Snower, Dennis J., 1998.
"Anatomy of Policy Complementarities,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Richard Disney & Robert Palacios & Edward Whitehouse, 1999. "Individual choice of pension arrangement as a pension reform strategy," IFS Working Papers W99/18, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Castellino, Onorato, 1995. "Redistribution between and within generations in the Italian social security system," Ricerche Economiche, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 317-327, December.
- Orszag, Mike & Snower, Dennis J., 1998. "Anatomy of policy complementarities," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 2252, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- Blanchard, Olivier & Wolfers, Justin, 2000.
"The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C1-33, March.
- Olivier Blanchard & Justin Wolfers, 1999. "The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Burda, Michael C., 1999.
"European labor markets and the Euro: How much flexibility do we really need?,"
SFB 373 Discussion Papers
1999,41, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Burda, Michael C, 1999. "European Labour Markets and the Euro: How Much Flexibility Do We Really Need?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michael C. Burda, 2001. "European Labour Markets and the Euro: How Much Flexibility Do We Really Need?," Economics Working Papers 003, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes.
- Boeri, Tito, 1999.
"Enforcement of employment security regulations, on-the-job search and unemployment duration,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 65-89, January.
- Boeri, Tito, 1998. "Enforcement of Employment Security Regulations, On-The-Job Search and Unemployment Duration," CEPR Discussion Papers 1850, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999.
"Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June.
- Cukierman, A. & Lippi, F., 1998. "Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Some Evidence," Discussion Paper 1998-116, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Giuseppe Nicoletti & Stefano Scarpetta & Olivier Boylaud, 2000. "Summary Indicators of Product Market Regulation with an Extension to Employment Protection Legislation," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 226, OECD Publishing.
- David Coe & Dennis Snower, 1996.
"Policy Complementarities: The Case for Fundamental Labor Market Reform,"
Archive Discussion Papers
9625, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- David T. Coe & Dennis J. Snower, 1997. "Policy Complementarities: The Case for Fundamental Labor Market Reform," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 44(1), pages 1-35, March.
- Dennis J. Snower & David T. Coe, 1996. "Policy Complementarities; The Case for Fundamental Labor Market Reform," IMF Working Papers 96/93, International Monetary Fund.
- Coe, David T & Snower, Dennis J., 1997. "Policy Complementarities: The Case for Fundamental Labour Market Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers 1585, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- repec:hhs:iuiwop:500 is not listed on IDEAS
- Alan B. Krueger, 2000. "From Bismarck to Maastricht: The March to European Union and the Labor Compact," NBER Working Papers 7456, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2371. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.