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Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Debt

Author

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  • Cornelli, Francesca
  • Yosha, Oved

Abstract

Venture capital financing is characterized by extensive use of convertible debt and stage financing. The paper shows why convertible debt is better than a simple mixture of debt and equity in stage financing situations. When the venture capitalist retains the option to abandon the project, the entrepreneur has an incentive to engage in ‘window dressing’ or short-termism, i.e. to bias positively the short-term performance of the project, in order to reduce the probability that the project will be liquidated. With a convertible debt contract, such behaviour reduces the likelihood of liquidation, but increases the probability that the venture capitalist will convert debt into equity, reducing the entrepreneur’s profits. With convertible debt, therefore, the entrepreneur will not engage in as much short-term behaviour in terms of signal manipulation in comparison to a situation where only straight debt-equity financing is used.

Suggested Citation

  • Cornelli, Francesca & Yosha, Oved, 1997. "Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 1735, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1735
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mayer, Colin & Schoors, Koen & Yafeh, Yishay, 2002. "Sources of Funds and Investment Activities of Venture Capital Funds: Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the UK," CEPR Discussion Papers 3340, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Nielsen, 2001. "Public Policy for Venture Capital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(4), pages 557-572, August.
    3. de Carvalho, Antonio Gledson & Calomiris, Charles W. & de Matos, João Amaro, 2008. "Venture capital as human resource management," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 223-255.
    4. Pia Weiss, 2002. "A Note on Firms' Strategic Behaviour During an IPO," Microeconomics 0201003, EconWPA.
    5. Giacinta CESTONE, 2001. "Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 480.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 890-930, June.
    7. Klaus M. Schmidt, 2003. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1139-1166, June.
    8. Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 1998. "Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 703-735, August.
    9. Bascha, Andreas & Walz, Uwe, 2001. "Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions in venture capital finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 285-306, September.
    10. Alan Hughes & Jaeho Lee, 2006. "What's in a name and when does it matter? The hot and cold market impacts on underpricing of certification, reputation and conflicts of interest in venture capital backed Korean IPOs," Working Papers wp336, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    11. Keuschnigg, Christian & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2003. "Tax policy, venture capital, and entrepreneurship," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 175-203, January.
    12. Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, 2001. "The Venture Capital Revolution," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 145-168, Spring.
    13. Cumming, Douglas J. & MacIntosh, Jeffrey G., 2003. "A cross-country comparison of full and partial venture capital exits," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 511-548, March.
    14. Bascha, Andreas & Walz, Uwe, 2002. "Financing practices in the German venture capital industry: An empirical assessment," CFS Working Paper Series 2002/08, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    15. N. Berger, Allen & F. Udell, Gregory, 1998. "The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 613-673, August.
    16. Georg Gebhardt & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2002. "Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(3), pages 235-255, August.
    17. Emmanuelle Dubocage & Géraldine Galindo, 2008. "Le rôle des capital-risqueurs dans l'isomorphisme stratégique des "biotechs"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 11(4), pages 5-30, December.
    18. Hirukawa, Masayuki & Ueda, Masako, 2008. "Venture Capital and Innovation: Which is First?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7090, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Hellmann, Thomas, 2002. "A theory of strategic venture investing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 285-314, May.
    20. Roberta Dessí, 1999. "Financing Entrepreneurs: Optimal Contracts and the Role of Intermediaries," FMG Discussion Papers dp328, Financial Markets Group.
    21. Steven Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics (joint with Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Legros) Note the special time," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000095, UCLA Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    convertible debt; Short Termism; Venture Capital; window dressing;

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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