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Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen

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  • Gebhardt, Georg
  • Schmidt, Klaus M.

Abstract

In this paper we give an overview, with special emphasis on Germany, of the recent development of the market for venture capital. We analyse the financial contracting problems that arise when entrepreneurs need capital from outside investors, and demonstrate how these problems are addressed by the institutions and contracts observed in the market for venture capital. Finally, we discuss the arguments in favour of government subsidies for private R and D, and argue that there are positive incentive effects if these subsidies are given to venture capital financed projects, rather than to established firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Gebhardt, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2002. "Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen," Munich Reprints in Economics 20320, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:20320
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Schertler, 2005. "European venture capital markets: fund providers and investment characteristics," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(6), pages 367-380.
    2. Engel, Dirk, 2002. "The Impact of Venture Capital on Firm Growth: An Empirical Investigation," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-02, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    3. Heneric, Oliver & Engel, Dirk & Champenois, Claire, 2004. "The Birth of German Biotechnology Industry: Did Venture Capital run the Show?," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-09, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    4. Carola Jungwirth & Petra Moog, 2003. "Support Strategies in Venture Capital Financing: Nurturing or Selection," Working Papers 0018, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    5. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber & Philipp Tillessen, 2003. "Tax Policy and Entrepreneurship in the Presence of Asymmetric Information in Capital Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 872, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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