IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/12305.html

The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Edmans, Alex
  • Fang, Vivian
  • Huang, Allen

Abstract

This paper shows that short-term stock price concerns induce CEOs to take value-reducing actions. Vesting equity, our measure of short-term concerns, is positively associated with the probability of a firm repurchasing shares, the amount of shares repurchased, and the probability of the firm announcing a merger and acquisition (M&A). When vesting equity increases, stock returns are more positive in the two quarters surrounding both repurchases and M&A, but more negative in the two years following repurchases and four years following M&A. These results are inconsistent with CEOs buying underpriced stocks or companies to maximize long-run shareholder value, but consistent with these actions being used to boost the short-term stock price and improve the conditions for equity sales. Overall, by identifying actions that carry clear value implications, this paper documents the long-term negative consequences of short-term incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Edmans, Alex & Fang, Vivian & Huang, Allen, 2017. "The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12305, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12305
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP12305
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dittmann, Ingolf & Li, Amy Yazhu & Obernberger, Stefan & Zheng, Jiaqi (Jacky), 2025. "Equity-based compensation and the timing of share repurchases: the role of the corporate calendar," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1).
    2. Ke, Dun-Yao & Su, Xuan-Qi, 2024. "How Do Elite-Educated CEOs Choose the M&A Payment Method? Evidence from Taiwan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    3. Cucinelli, Doriana & Soana, Maria Gaia, 2023. "Systemic risk in non financial companies: Does governance matter?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    4. Hoffmann, Florian & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2021. "Dynamic multitasking and managerial investment incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 954-974.
    5. Shackleton, Mark & Yao, Yaqiong & Zuo, Ziran, 2025. "Corporate social responsibility and insider horizon," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    6. Xiong, Yan & Jiang, Xu, 2022. "Economic consequences of managerial compensation contract disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2).
    7. De Cesari, Amedeo & Marinelli, Nicoletta & Sonika, Rohit, 2024. "The timing of stock repurchases: Do well-connected CEOs help or harm?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    8. Sadhna Bagchi & Lalit Prasad & Mukesh Shrivastava, 2024. "Behavioural Biases in Financial Investments: A Comprehensive Literature Review," Acta Universitatis Bohemiae Meridionalis, University of South Bohemia in Ceske Budejovice, Faculty of Economics, vol. 27(3), pages 81-93.
    9. Bratten, Brian & Huang, Meng & Jenkins, Nicole Thorne & Xie, Hong, 2025. "Mandatory disclosures and opportunism: Evidence from repurchases," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1).
    10. Jan Schymik & Matthias Meier & Alexander Schramm & Alexander Schwemmer, 2025. "Capital (Mis)allocation, Incentives and Productivity," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_637, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    11. Gretha Steenkamp & Nicolene Wesson & Eon v. d. M. Smit, 2023. "Camouflaged Compensation: Do South African Executives Increase Their Pay through Share Repurchases?," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 16(3), pages 1-17, March.
    12. Gu, Zhenjiang & Lu, Louise Yi & Yu, Yangxin, 2024. "CEO equity incentive duration and expected crash risk," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6).
    13. Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2023. "CEO compensation: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12305. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.