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Network financing with two-part and single tariff

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  • GAUTIER, Axel

Abstract

This paper compares two types of access pricing: a two-part tariff where the fixed part aims to cover (part of) the network's fixed cost and the variable part covers the network's usage costs and a single tariff where both the usage and (part of) the infrastructure costs are covered by a per-unit access charge. It compares how the regulator trades-off the degree of competition induced by the access charges and the network financing.

Suggested Citation

  • GAUTIER, Axel, 2005. "Network financing with two-part and single tariff," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005034, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2005034
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2005.html
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Axel Gautier & Manipushpak Mitra, 2008. "Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(300), pages 662-682, November.
    2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Access pricing and competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1673-1710, December.
    3. Emmanuelle Auriol & Jean‐Jacques Laffont, 1992. "Regulation By Duopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 507-533, September.
    4. Russell Pittman, 2004. "Russian Railways Reform and the Problem of Non‐discriminatory Access to Infrastructure," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 167-192, June.
    5. Caillaud, Bernard, 1990. "Regulation, competition, and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 87-110, October.
    6. Gans, Joshua S, 2001. "Regulating Private Infrastructure Investment: Optimal Pricing for Access to Essential Facilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 167-189, September.
    7. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2004. "The Design of an Efficient Private Industry," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 516-525, 04/05.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kaniska Dam & Axel Gautier & Manipushpak Mitra, 2007. "Efficient Access Pricing and Endogenous Market Structure," Working Papers DTE 384, CIDE, División de Economía.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    access pricing market structure; network financin;

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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