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Framed Norms. The effect of choice-belief information on tax compliance

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  • F. Atzori
  • V. Pelligra

Abstract

Understanding the factors influencing people's choices in tax compliance decision-making is still important because tax evasion is a crucial issue for governments everywhere. This lab experiment investigates how social norms influence tax compliance behavior. We examine the effects of positive and negative empirical and normative expectations using the opinion-matching approach for measurement. According to our results, normative expectations—as opposed to empirical expectations—most strongly impact people's behavior. Surprisingly, positive empirical messages may have a negative effect, increasing tax evasion. Furthering our understanding of the causes of tax evasion, we also include a norm-following task to assess participants' propensity to adhere to norms. This study presents new viewpoints on tax compliance while replicating some established conclusions from previous research sheds new light on the interaction between tax compliance and social norms.

Suggested Citation

  • F. Atzori & V. Pelligra, 2024. "Framed Norms. The effect of choice-belief information on tax compliance," Working Paper CRENoS 202407, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  • Handle: RePEc:cns:cnscwp:202407
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    References listed on IDEAS

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