Collateral and Risk Sharing in group lending: evidence from an urban microcredit program
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- Eskander Alvi & Seife Dendir, 2009. "Private Transfers, Informal Loans and Risk Sharing Among Poor Urban Households in Ethiopia," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(8), pages 1325-1343.
- Sugato Chakravarty & Abu Zafar M. Shahriar, 2015. "Selection of Borrowing Partners in Joint Liability–Based Microcredit: Evidence from Framed Field Experiments in Bangladesh," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 39(1), pages 129-144, January.
- OA Carboni & G Medda, 2007. "Government Size and the Composition of Public Spending in a Neoclassical Growth Model," Working Paper CRENoS 200701, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- Selay Sahan & Euan Phimister, 2023. "Repayment performance of joint‐liability microcredits: Metropolitan evidence on social capital and group names," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 287-311, April.
- Yan Liu & Guang???Zhen Sun, 2008. "Competition And Access Regulation In The Telecommunications Industry With Multiple Networks," Monash Economics Working Papers 25/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Dyuti Banerjee & Anupama Sethi, 2008. "Intra-Group Transfers And Group Formation," Monash Economics Working Papers 24/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
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Keywords
; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DEV-2006-02-26 (Development)
- NEP-FIN-2006-02-26 (Finance)
- NEP-FMK-2006-02-26 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-IAS-2006-02-26 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MFD-2006-02-26 (Microfinance)
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