Exchange Controls and Hyperinflation as Efficient Governmental Responses to Externally Imposed Trade Liberalization
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- Hickson, Charles R. & Thompson, Earl A., 1991. "A new theory of guilds and european economic development," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 127-168, April.
- Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1990.
"Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game,"
American Economic Review,
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- Lohani, Prakash & Thompson, Earl A, 1971. "The Optimal Rate of Secular Inflation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(5), pages 962-82, Sept.-Oct.
- Paul A. Samuelson, 1969. "Nonoptimality of Money Holding under Laissez Faire," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 2(2), pages 303-308, May.
- Kemp, Murray C. & Ohyama, Michihiro, 1978. "On the sharing of trade gains by resource-poor and resource-rich countries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 93-115, February.
- Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1978. "Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bhag78-1, September.
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