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Asymmetric Information, Long Term Labor Contracts, Inefficient Job Separations

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  • John Haltiwanger

    (UCLA)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • John Haltiwanger, 1982. "Asymmetric Information, Long Term Labor Contracts, Inefficient Job Separations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 276, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:276
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp276.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 301-307, May.
    2. Jerry R. Green, 1981. "Wage-Employment Contracts (Replaced by W0675)," NBER Working Papers 0623, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Hashimoto, Masanori, 1979. "Bonus Payments, on-the-Job Training, and Lifetime Employment in Japan," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 1086-1104, October.
    4. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-1284, December.
    5. Lorne Carmichael, 1983. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 251-258, Spring.
    6. Hall, Robert E & Lazear, Edward P, 1984. "The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 233-257, April.
    7. Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-957, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gielen, A. C. & van Ours, J.C., 2006. "Why do Worker-Firm Matches Dissolve?," Other publications TiSEM 8c99a292-9f34-4ce8-8fd9-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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