On the Relationship Between Risk Aversion and the Development of Long Term Worker-Firm Attachments
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- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 301-07, May.
- Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1980.
"Search, Layoffs, and Labor Market Equilibrium,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(4), pages 652-72, August.
- Martin Neil Baily, 1974. "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 37-50.
- Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
- John Haltiwanger, 1982. "Specific CApital, Long Term Implicit Contracts, and Temporary Layoffs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 245, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 9.
- Grossman, Herschel I., 1978. "Risk shifting, layoffs, and seniority," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 661-686, November.
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