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Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts

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  • Bengt Holmstrom

Abstract

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  • Bengt Holmstrom, 1980. "Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts," Discussion Papers 414R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:414r
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/414.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. V.V. Chari, 1980. "Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts," Discussion Papers 459, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. George A. Akerlof & Hajime Miyazaki, 1980. "The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment meets the Wage Bill Argument," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(2), pages 321-338.
    3. Arnott, Richard J & Hosios, Arthur J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. "Implicit Contracts, Labor Mobility, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1046-1066, December.
    4. Barro, Robert J & Grossman, Herschel I, 1971. "A General Disequilibrium Model of Income and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 82-93, March.
    5. Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-957, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Claudio Michelacci & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2009. "Financial Markets and Wages," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(2), pages 795-827.
    2. Joan E. Ricarti Costa, 1984. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Discussion Papers 595S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. John Haltiwanger, 1982. "On the Relationship Between Risk Aversion and the Development of Long Term Worker-Firm Attachments," UCLA Economics Working Papers 274, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1984. "Insurance Aspects of Labor Market Contracting: An Overview," UCLA Economics Working Papers 348, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. John Haltiwanger, 1982. "Specific CApital, Long Term Implicit Contracts, and Temporary Layoffs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 245, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Atreya Chakraborty & Christopher F. Baum, 1997. "Poison Pills, Optimal Contracting and the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from Fortune 500 Firms," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 393, Boston College Department of Economics.
    7. John Haltiwanger, 1985. "Inventories, Multiperiod Implicit Contracts, and the Dynamic Behavior if the Firm Under Uncertainty," UCLA Economics Working Papers 374, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. John Geanakoplos & Takatoshi Ito, 1982. "On Implicit Contracts and Involuntary Unemployment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 640, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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