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Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players

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  • Drew Fudenberg
  • David K. Levine

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1988. "Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 221, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:221
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/openclosed.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 1, pages 3-20 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Green, Edward J., 1980. "Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 155-182, April.
    3. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 549-569, May.
    4. Green, Edward J, 1984. "Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 975-993, July.
    5. Roberts, Kevin, 1980. "The limit points of monopolistic competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 256-278, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Benchekroun, Hassan & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 355-374.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 6, pages 95-120 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Levine, David K., 1991. "Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 148-164, June.
    4. Niko Jaakkola & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2017. "Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Climate Policies with Anticipated Breakthrough Technology," OxCarre Working Papers 190, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    5. Maurizion Iacopetta, 2016. "Commercial revolutions, search, and development," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2016-08, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    6. Benchekroun, Hassan & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 355-374.
    7. repec:spr:annopr:v:255:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-016-2340-z is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Yepes Rodríguez, R., 2005. "Análisis mediante teoría de juegos de la evolución de la competencia en el sector eléctrico español/Game theoretic analysis of the evolution of competition in Spanish power sector," Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Estudios de Economía Aplicada, vol. 23, pages 335-362, Agosto.

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