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Observation, Flexibilité et Structures Technologiques des Industries

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  • Marcel Boyer
  • Armel Jacques
  • Michel Moreaux

Abstract

We study the links between observability and flexible technological choices in a duopolistic market. We show that, in large markets, the strategic value of flexibility is positive and observability of technological choices promotes the adoption of more flexible technologies whereas in small markets, the strategic value of flexibility is negative and observability decreases the level of flexibility chosen by firms. On étudie l'impact des conditions d'observation sur les choix de flexibilité technologique dans un duopole. Si le marché est de taille importante, la valeur stratégique de la flexibilité est positive et l'observation des choix technologiques favorise l'adoption de technologies flexibles alors que si le marché est de taille plus faible, la valeur stratégique de la flexibilité est négative et l'observation amène les firmes à choisir des technologies moins flexibles.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Armel Jacques & Michel Moreaux, 2002. "Observation, Flexibilité et Structures Technologiques des Industries," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-12, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2002s-12
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2002s-12.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bagwell, Kyle, 1995. "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-366, May.
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    4. Roller, Lars-Hendrik & Tombak, Mihkel M, 1990. "Strategic Choice of Flexible Production Technologies and Welfare Implications," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(4), pages 417-431, June.
    5. Marcel Boyer & Michel Moreaux, 1997. "Capacity Commitment versus Flexibility," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 347-376, June.
    6. George Stigler, 1939. "Production and Distribution in the Short Run," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(3), pages 305-305.
    7. Raith, Michael, 1996. "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 260-288, October.
    8. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 511-528, June.
    9. Marcel Boyer & Armel Jacques & Michel Moreaux, 2001. "Bankruptcy Cost, Financial Structure and Technological Flexibility Choices," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-27, CIRANO.
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Jose Gil-Molto & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2006. "Flexible vs Dedicated Technology Adoption in the Presence of a Public Firm," Discussion Paper Series 2006_1, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Jan 2006.
    2. María José Gil‐Moltó & Joanna Poyago‐Theotoky, 2008. "Flexible versus Dedicated Technology Adoption in the Presence of a Public Firm," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(4), pages 997-1016, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Flexibility; Observation; Duopoly; Flexibilité; observation; duopole;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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