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Planification fiscale des sociétés québécoises et recours aux paradis fiscaux

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  • Julien Martin

Abstract

Les entreprises peuvent utiliser différentes dispositions fiscales pour réduire leur impôt sur le revenu. Ces dispositions prévues par le législateur poursuivent différents objectifs économiques. Par exemple, la législation fiscale prévoit un crédit d’impôt à la recherche et développement pour stimuler les activités d’innovation. D’autres dispositions fiscales peuvent être utilisées de façon concomitante avec les dispositions énoncées dans des législations fiscales de pays tiers pour s’insérer dans des stratégies de planification fiscale controversées. Ces stratégies peuvent répondre à la lettre des législations fiscales concernées mais pas nécessairement à leur esprit ou leur intention. Ces stratégies sont alors considérées comme de l’évitement fiscal. L’évitement fiscal a pour conséquence de fragiliser l’assiette fiscale des gouvernements et de diminuer les revenus fiscaux perçus par l’État nécessaires au financement des services publics. C’est le cas notamment du recours aux paradis fiscaux examiné dans le présent rapport. Pour évaluer l’ampleur du phénomène du recours aux paradis fiscaux par les entreprises, deux approches sont mobilisées. La première approche consiste à calculer le taux effectif de taxation supporté par les sociétés. La seconde approche repose sur une quantification macroéconomique de l’importance des paradis fiscaux parmi les différentes stratégies fiscales visant à réduire le montant d’impôt à payer par les entreprises. Selon les estimations, entre 25 % et 30 % des profits des entreprises canadiennes réalisés à l’étranger le sont dans des paradis fiscaux. Les calculs montrent que ce type de planification fiscale permet d’alléger l’impôt sur le revenu des entreprises canadiennes d’environ 7 %. Les estimations apportent des chiffres plus bas pour le Québec : le recours aux paradis fiscaux permet aux entreprises d’alléger leur impôt sur le revenu d’environ 5 %. Ainsi, près de 12 % de l’écart entre le taux statutaire de taxation applicable aux sociétés québécoises et le taux de taxation effectivement payé par ces sociétés est expliqué par le recours aux paradis fiscaux. Il convient de noter que ces chiffres cachent une forte hétérogénéité dans l’utilisation de stratégies d’évitement fiscal par les entreprises. Ainsi, les entreprises actives dans certains secteurs d’activité semblent avoir des stratégies de planification beaucoup plus agressives que d’autres – c’est le cas par exemple dans les secteurs de la finance et de l’assurance. Par ailleurs, le recours au paradis fiscaux est utilisé par un nombre très restreint de très grandes entreprises. Comme dans toute étude, les résultats présentés dans ce rapport doivent être pris avec précaution. La méthodologie reprise ici s’appuie sur des études scientifiques rigoureuses et éprouvées. Néanmoins, les données sur l’activité des sociétés à l’étranger – en particulier dans les paradis fiscaux – sont extrêmement limitées au Canada et quasi inexistantes au Québec. Face au manque de données, la collecte de données détaillées sur l’activité internationale des entreprises par des organismes statistiques et leur analyse rigoureuse semblent impératives. Ces outils permettront d’appréhender plus finement les pratiques de recours aux paradis fiscaux par les multinationales et ainsi guider les choix législatifs relatifs à ces pratiques.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Martin, 2018. "Planification fiscale des sociétés québécoises et recours aux paradis fiscaux," CIRANO Project Reports 2018rp-20, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirpro:2018rp-20
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    References listed on IDEAS

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