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The Design of an Efficient Offshoring Strategy: Some Reflections and Links to SNC-Lavalin

Listed author(s):
  • Marcel Boyer

The objectives of this paper are threefold; First, to brush an overview of the underlying drivers of the offshoring phenomenon that have appeared on economic and public policy radar screens over the last 15 years; Second, to look at the recent offshoring experience of a large Canadian engineering firm (SNC-Lavalin) with significant international experience and exposure; Third, to draw from the analysis, the evidence and the case at hand some lessons for public policy aimed at defining winning offshoring strategies. L'objectif de ce rapport est triple : d'abord, dresser le tableau des facteurs sous-jacents au phénomène de l'impartition offshore devenu un sujet de préoccupation en politique publique; ensuite, considérer l'expérience récente d'une grande entreprise canadienne d'ingénierie (SNC-Lavalin) en cette matière; finalement, inférer de ces analyses, de ces données et de ce cas, des leçons pour la définition de politiques gagnantes d'offshoring.

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File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2007RP-01.pdf
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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Project Reports with number 2007rp-01.

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Length: 56 pages
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2007
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirpro:2007rp-01
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  1. David Scharfstein, 1988. "Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 147-155, Spring.
  2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, July.
  3. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn.
  4. Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1992. "The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 350-365, Autumn.
  5. Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1994. "Heterogeneity in Organizational Form: Why Otherwise Identical Firms Choose Different Incentives for Their Managers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(4), pages 518-537, Winter.
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