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Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power

Author

Listed:
  • Tom Campbell

    (Fowler School of Law, Chapman University)

  • Nathaniel T. Wilcox

    (Economics Science Institute, Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)

Abstract

From 1960 to 2015, Federal District Court opinions involving challenges to Executive Branch authority show that U.S. Federal District Court judges (trial judges) support such authority less as they age, with a sharp decline beginning near age 57. We argue that District judges know that elevation to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals becomes increasingly improbable, and hence have less reason to ‘cooperate’ with the Executive, with advancing age. Political variables (and other variables) introduced as extra regressors do not reverse our main results. When there are contemporaneous vacancies on their Circuit courts, District judges in the eleven State Circuits (but not the District of Columbia circuit) are also more likely to favor the Executive.

Suggested Citation

  • Tom Campbell & Nathaniel T. Wilcox, 2017. "Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power," Working Papers 17-23, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:17-23
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Elisha Carol Savchak & Thomas G. Hansford & Donald R. Songer & Kenneth L. Manning & Robert A. Carp, 2006. "Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 478-493, April.
    4. Cohen, Mark A., 1992. "The motives of judges: Empirical evidence from antitrust sentencing," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 13-30, March.
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    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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