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Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power

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  • Tom Campbell
  • Nathaniel T. Wilcox

Abstract

From 1960 to 2015, opinions of US federal district court judges (trial judges) in cases involving challenges to executive branch authority show that these judges favor executive authority less as they age. We suggest that district judges know that elevation to the federal circuit court of appeals becomes increasingly improbable, and hence have less reason to cooperate with the executive, with advancing age. Political variables, seniority of judges, and other variables introduced as extra regressors do not reverse this main result, nor does it appear to be the product of cohort effects or selection off the district court. When there are contemporaneous vacancies on their circuit courts, district judges in the 11 state circuits (but not the District of Columbia Circuit) are also more likely to favor the executive.

Suggested Citation

  • Tom Campbell & Nathaniel T. Wilcox, 2020. "Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 181-202.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/706151
    DOI: 10.1086/706151
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    1. Elisha Carol Savchak & Thomas G. Hansford & Donald R. Songer & Kenneth L. Manning & Robert A. Carp, 2006. "Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 478-493, April.
    2. Cohen, Mark A, 1991. "Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" about the Sentencing Commission?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 183-199, Spring.
    3. Cohen, Mark A., 1992. "The motives of judges: Empirical evidence from antitrust sentencing," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 13-30, March.
    4. Estrella, Arturo, 2003. "Critical Values And P Values Of Bessel Process Distributions: Computation And Application To Structural Break Tests," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(6), pages 1128-1143, December.
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    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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