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Fiscal Unions Redux

Author

Listed:
  • Patrick J. Kehoe

    (Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM))

Abstract

Before the advent of sophisticated international financial markets, a widely accepted belief was that within a monetary union, a union-wide authority orchestrating fiscal transfers between countries is necessary to provide adequate insurance against country-specific economic fluctuations. A natural question is then: Do sophisticated international financial markets obviate the need for such an active union-wide authority? We argue that they do. Specifically, we show that in a benchmark economy with no international financial markets, an activist union-wide authority is necessary to achieve desirable outcomes. With sophisticated financial markets, however, such an authority is unnecessary if its only goal is to provide cross-country insurance. Since restricting the set of policy instruments available to member countries does not create a fiscal externality across them, this result holds in a wide variety of settings. Finally, we establish that an activist union-wide authority concerned just with providing insurance across member countries is optimal only when individual countries are either unable or unwilling to pursue desirable policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick J. Kehoe, 2017. "Fiscal Unions Redux," Discussion Papers 1712, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
  • Handle: RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1712
    as

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    File URL: http://www.centreformacroeconomics.ac.uk/Discussion-Papers/2017/CFMDP2017-12-Paper.pdf
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    Other versions of this item:

    • Patrick J. Kehoe & Elena Pastorino, 2017. "Fiscal unions redux," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 741-776, December.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Obstfeld, Maurice & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1995. "Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 624-660, June.
    2. Gali­, Jordi & Monacelli, Tommaso, 2008. "Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 116-132, September.
    3. Emmanuel Farhi & Iván Werning, 2017. "Fiscal Unions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(12), pages 3788-3834, December.
    4. Jordi Galí & Tommaso Monacelli, 2005. "Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 707-734.
    5. Varadarajan V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2008. "Time Inconsistency and Free-Riding in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(7), pages 1329-1356, October.
    6. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Emmanuel Farhi & Gita Gopinath, 2013. "Crisis and Commitment: Inflation Credibility and the Vulnerability to Sovereign Debt Crises," NBER Working Papers 19516, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Chari, V.V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2007. "On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2399-2408, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Xuan Wang, 2019. "When Do Currency Unions Benefit From Default ?," 2019 Papers pwa938, Job Market Papers.
    2. Xuan Wang, 2021. "Bankruptcy Codes and Risk Sharing of Currency Unions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-009/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Cristina Arellano & Timothy J. Kehoe & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2017. "Introduction to the Special Issue on Models of Debt and Debt Crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 605-610, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cross-country Externalities; Cross-country Insurance; Cross-country Transfers; Fiscal Externalities; International Financial Markets; International Transfers; Optimal Currency Area;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • F38 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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