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Heterogeneous Beliefs and the Demand for D&O Insurance by Listed Companies

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  • Peter Egger
  • Doina Radulescu
  • Ray Rees
  • Doina Maria Radulescu

Abstract

This paper introduces a new rationale for the existence of “Directors’ and Officers’” (D&O) insurance. We use a model with volatile stock markets where shareholders design compensation schemes that incentivize managers to stimulate short-term increases in stock prices that do not maximize long run stock market value. We show that D&O insurance provides a convenient instrument for the initial shareholders of a company to take advantage of differences in beliefs between insiders and outsiders in capital markets. The empirical results support the idea that both the insurance coverage and the premium are higher in the presence of new shareholders and volatile markets. The results prove robust in various empirical model specifications.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Egger & Doina Radulescu & Ray Rees & Doina Maria Radulescu, 2014. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and the Demand for D&O Insurance by Listed Companies," CESifo Working Paper Series 4621, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4621
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lin, Chen & Officer, Micah S. & Zou, Hong, 2011. "Directors' and officers' liability insurance and acquisition outcomes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 507-525.
    2. Patrick Bolton & José Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, 2006. "Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(3), pages 577-610.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
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    5. Shiller, Robert J, 1981. "Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 421-436, June.
    6. Boyer, M. Martin & Stern, Léa H., 2012. "Is corporate governance risk valued? Evidence from directors' and officers' insurance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 349-372.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. De-Lei Sheng & Linfeng Shi & Danping Li & Yanping Zhao, 2022. "Manage Pension Deficit with Heterogeneous Insurance," Methodology and Computing in Applied Probability, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 1119-1141, June.
    2. Chiang, Yao-Min & Chang, Pang-Ru, 2022. "Overinvestment, ownership structure, and directors' and officers’ liability insurance," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 38-50.
    3. Li-Su Huang, 2022. "Directors and officers liability insurance and default risk," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 47(2), pages 375-408, April.
    4. Luo, Yan & Krivogorsky, Victoria, 2017. "The materiality of directors' and officers' insurance information: Case for disclosure," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 69-74.
    5. Derrick W. H. Fung & Jason J. H. Yeh, 2018. "Inherent Virtue or Inevitable Evil: The Effects of Directors' and Officers' Insurance on Firm Value," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 21(2), pages 243-288, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D&O insurance; volatile markets; credible protection; panel data models;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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