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Does Indirect Tax Harmonization Deliver Pareto Improvements in the Presence of Global Public Goods?

Author

Listed:
  • Ourania Karakosta
  • Christos Kotsogiannis
  • Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia

Abstract

This paper identifies conditions under which, starting from any tax distorting equilibrium, destination- and origin-based indirect tax-harmonizing reforms are potentially Pareto improving in the presence of global public goods. The first condition (unrequited transfers between governments) requires that transfers are designed in such a way that the marginal valuations of the global public goods are equalized, whereas the second (conditional revenue changes) requires that the change in global tax revenues, as a consequence of tax harmonization, is consistent with the direction of inefficiency in global public good provision relative to the (modified) Samuelson rule. Under these conditions, tax harmonization results in redistributing the gains from a reduction in global deadweight loss and any changes in global tax revenues according to the Pareto principle. And this is the case independently of the tax principle in place (destination or origin).

Suggested Citation

  • Ourania Karakosta & Christos Kotsogiannis & Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, 2009. "Does Indirect Tax Harmonization Deliver Pareto Improvements in the Presence of Global Public Goods?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2668, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2668
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Funke & Marc Gronwald, 2009. "A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth," Quantitative Macroeconomics Working Papers 20906, Hamburg University, Department of Economics.
    2. Krishanu Karmakar & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2014. "Fiscal Competition versus Fiscal Harmonization: A Review of the Arguments," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1431, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    origin principle; destination principle; indirect tax harmonization; reform of commodity taxes; global; local public goods;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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