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Distortions for Nothing - Optimal Taxation of (Un)Distributed Profits

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  • Etienne Lehmann
  • Eddy Zanoutene

Abstract

We study the optimal taxation of corporate and dividend income when entrepreneurs can use retained earnings to reduce their tax burden. We show that eliminating dividend taxes while increasing the corporate income tax (CIT) to keep investment unchanged raises total tax revenue. Our simulations suggest net revenue gains of 0.1-0.4% of GDP. In an infinite-horizon model, the optimal policy sets dividend taxes to zero in every period. As the discount factor approaches one and when the planner values only workers’ welfare, the optimal steady-state CIT converges to a standard inverse elasticity rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Etienne Lehmann & Eddy Zanoutene, 2026. "Distortions for Nothing - Optimal Taxation of (Un)Distributed Profits," CESifo Working Paper Series 12424, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12424
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

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