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Critical Thinking and Storytelling Contexts

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  • Brian Jabarian
  • Elia Sartori

Abstract

We argue that storytelling contexts – the way information is communicated through varying credibility sources, visual designs, writing styles, and content delivery – impact the effectiveness of surveys and elections in eliciting preferences formed through critical thinking (reasoned preferences). Through an artefactual field experiment with a US sample (N = 725), incentivized by an (LLM), we find that intermediate storytelling contexts prompt critical thinking more effectively than basic or sophisticated ones. Sensitivity to these contexts is linked to individual cognitive traits, and participants with a high need for cognition are particularly responsive to intermediate contexts. In a conceptual framework, we explore how critical thinkers impact the efficiency of elections and polls in aggregating reasoned preferences. Storytelling contexts that effectively prompt critical thinking improve election efficiency. However, the in-decisiveness of critical thinkers can have ambiguous effects on election bias, potentially posing challenges for principals who are required to act on these election outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Brian Jabarian & Elia Sartori, 2024. "Critical Thinking and Storytelling Contexts," CESifo Working Paper Series 11282, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11282
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