Corporate Governance in Argentina - New Developments through 1991-2000
This paper develops and provide evidence for three statements: a) In Argentina, there has been a marked shift in corporate governance structure from big family-owned domestic companies towards foreign groups and investment funds ownership. b)While coping with governance issues, Argentina has been performing as if it were following the common law countries tradition. c) The capital markets development has been nurturing contradictory forces which could bring about alternative governance structures in the foreseeable future. To ground these statements on facts, we previously survey corporate governance issues in Argentina before 1991, the underlying legal framework, the new rules of the game in capital structure and ownership as from 1991, largely due to a wave of privatizations, restructuring, mergers and acquisitions that has taken place through the last decade.
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