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Endogenous social influence in an experimental dilemma game

We study whether people's behavior in a one-shot sequential public goods type situation is affected by social information about average behavior by others in the same situation. The kind of social information we consider does not directly affect subjects' payoffs and we are, therefore, able to separate pure social influence from more conventional distributional effects. We find clear evidence for other-regarding preferences; a specific patterns that we identify is that the more generous a subject, the more reciprocal his responses to others' actions. However, there is very little indication of social influence in our data. The results suggest that current static models of social preferences need not take into account the effect of social influence.

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Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number 2004/59.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_59
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  1. Durlauf,S.N., 2000. "A framework for the study of individual behavior and social interactions," Working papers 16, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  2. Myles, Gareth D. & Naylor, Robin A., 1996. "A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 49-66, April.
  3. Charness, Gary B & Rabin, Matthew, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0dc3k4m5, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  4. Timothy N. Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 1998. "Social Influence in the Sequential Dictator Game," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-37, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  5. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2000. "Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 227-238, March.
  6. Gary Bolton, 1998. "Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 257-281, December.
  7. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, 1999. "Reciprocity in a Two Part Dictator Game," Working Papers 99-28, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  8. Georg Kirchsteiger & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5899, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  9. repec:att:wimass:9217 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Bohnet, Iris & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003. "Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining," Working Paper Series rwp03-028, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  11. Schram, Arthur, 2000. " Sorting Out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 231-58, June.
  12. Dufwenberg, Martin & Muren, Astri, 2002. "Discrimination by Gender and Social Distance," Research Papers in Economics 2002:2, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  13. repec:dgr:uvatin:20010003 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Gary E. Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Elena Katok, 2000. "How strategy sensitive are contributions?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 367-387.
  15. repec:dgr:kubcen:199837 is not listed on IDEAS
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