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How strategy sensitive are contributions?

Author

Listed:
  • Gary E. Bolton

    (Department of Management Science and Information Systems, 310 Beam, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA)

  • Jordi Brandts

    (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica , Campus UAB, E-08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, SPAIN)

  • Elena Katok

    (Department of Management Science and Information Systems, 310 Beam, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA)

Abstract

We test six hypotheses for contributions in dilemma games, a category that includes the prisoner's dilemma and public goods games. Our experiment focuses specifically on the strategic interdependence of contributing behavior, and manipulates the strategy space of a two-person dilemma game especially designed for the task. The hypothesis that contributors have non-linear preferences over own and the other player's payoffs accurately matches the strategic pattern of contributing that we observe across treatments. None of the reasons for contributing advanced by the other hypotheses, whether alone or in additive combination, does so.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary E. Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Elena Katok, 2000. "How strategy sensitive are contributions?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(2), pages 367-387.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:15:y:2000:i:2:p:367-387
    Note: Received: March 31, 1999; revised version: May 21, 1999
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    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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