Problems of Democratic Control in European Security and Defense Politics – a View from Peace and Conflict Research
Since EU members have agreed to establish integrated military forces and to decide jointly on their deployment in European institutions, the EU’s “democratic deficit†is no longer confined to issues of common market governance but also includes foreign, security and defense politics. Drawing on recent debates in peace and conflict research, I will argue that a democratic deficit in European security and defense politics is not only worrying for its own sake but also because a growing body of literature regards the democratic control of security and defense politics as the best guarantee to maintain peaceful and cooperative relations with other states.
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| Date of creation: | 05 Sep 2007 |
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| Handle: | RePEc:cdl:bineur:qt65b9q82m |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://www.escholarship.org/repec/ies/
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mansfield, Edward D. & Pevehouse, Jon C., 2006. "Democratization and International Organizations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(01), pages 137-167, January.
- Milner, Helen V. & Kubota, Keiko, 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(01), pages 107-143, January.
- Schultz, Kenneth A., 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(02), pages 233-266, March.
- Mansfield, Edward D. & Milner, Helen V. & Rosendorff, B. Peter, 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(03), pages 477-513, June.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley, 2003. "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(04), pages 801-827, September.
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