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Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies

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  • Erik Gartzke
  • Kristian Skrede Gleditsch

Abstract

Recent research builds on the observation that democracies have more durable alliances to argue that democracies make more reliable allies. This need not be the case. Alliances serve as commitment devices, adding ex ante credibility to states' claims about ex post behavior. Variation in alliance durability must reflect differences in the desirability of formalizing alignments. Put simply, democracies are “most improved” by formal commitments. We offer two related explanations for why democracies might actually be less reliable alliance partners. Information costs for participating in policymaking and the advantages of organized interest groups combined with distributional incentives generated by the periodic turnover of governments may conspire to make informal commitments on the part of democracies problematic. Determining the net effect of democratic virtue and vice is best done empirically. We test alliance reliability by focusing on intervention, rather than on the duration or the number of commitments. Our results suggest that democracies make less reliable allies.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Gartzke & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 2004. "Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 775-795, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:4:p:775-795
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00101.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Wagner, Wolfgang, 2007. "Problems of Democratic Control in European Security and Defense Politics – a View from Peace and Conflict Research," Institute of European Studies, Working Paper Series qt65b9q82m, Institute of European Studies, UC Berkeley.
    2. Brett V. Benson & Joshua D. Clinton, 2016. "Assessing the Variation of Formal Military Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(5), pages 866-898, August.
    3. Joshua Alley, 2023. "Elite Cues and Public Attitudes Towards Military Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 67(7-8), pages 1537-1563, August.
    4. Brett Ashley Leeds & Michaela Mattes & Jeremy S. Vogel, 2009. "Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 461-476, April.
    5. Jesse C Johnson & Stephen Joiner, 2021. "Power changes, alliance credibility, and extended deterrence," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 178-199, March.
    6. Gomez, Miguel Alberto & Winger, Gregory, 2023. "Public Opinion and Alliance Commitments in Cybersecurity: An Attack Against All?," SocArXiv bcwhu, Center for Open Science.
    7. Bruce Desmarais, 2012. "Lessons in disguise: multivariate predictive mistakes in collective choice models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 719-737, June.
    8. Douglas M. Gibler & Scott Wolford, 2006. "Alliances, Then Democracy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(1), pages 129-153, February.
    9. Xinyuan Dai, 2006. "The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(5), pages 690-713, October.
    10. Isa Camyar, 2019. "Parliamentary and semi-presidential advantages in the sovereign credit market: democratic institutional design and sovereign credibility," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 383-406, December.
    11. Atsushi Tago, 2014. "Too many problems at home to help you: Domestic disincentives for military coalition participation," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 262-278, September.
    12. John Conybeare & Dong-Hun Kim, 2010. "Democracy, Institutionalization, and Corporate Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(5), pages 715-744, October.
    13. J. Andrés Gannon & Daniel Kent, 2021. "Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(5), pages 889-918, May.
    14. Douglas M. Gibler, 2008. "The Costs of Reneging," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(3), pages 426-454, June.
    15. Olga Chyzh, 2014. "Can you trust a dictator: A strategic model of authoritarian regimes’ signing and compliance with international treaties," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 3-27, February.

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