A Note on Log Concave Survivor Functions in Auctions
In a standard English auction in which bidders’ valuations are independently drawn from a common distribution, a standard regularity condition is that the survivor function of the distribution be log concave. In an auction where the seller sets a fixed price, the equivalent condition requires log concavity of a survivor function derived from the primitive distribution. In this note we show that log concavity of the primitive survivor function implies log concavity in the derived functions. This result is of interest when studying on-line auctions that combined aspects of fixed-price and English auctions.
|Date of creation:||27 Apr 2010|
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- Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2005.
"Log-concave probability and its applications,"
Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 445-469, 08.
- Lebrun, Bernard, 2006. "Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 131-151, April.
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