Spam - solutions and their problems
We analyze the success of filtering as a solution to the spam problem when used alone or concurrently with sender and/or receiver pricing. We find that filters alone may exacerbate the spam problem if the spammer attempts to evade them by sending multiple variants of the message to each consumer. Sender and receiver prices can effectively reduce or eliminating spam, either on their own or when used together with filtering. Finally, we discuss the impli- cations for social welfare of using the different spam controls.
|Date of creation:||15 Oct 2008|
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- Robert Kraut & Shyam Sunder & Rahul Telang & James Morris, 2005. "Pricing Electronic Mail to Solve the Problem of Spam," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2638, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Oct 2005.
- Loder Theodore & Van Alstyne Marshall & Wash Rick, 2006. "An Economic Response to Unsolicited Communication," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-38, March.
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