IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cam/camdae/2582.html

Financial Twins: Adapting Long-term Contract Designs to new Electricity Systems

Author

Listed:
  • Soumoy, L.
  • Abada, I.
  • Ehrenmann, A.
  • Massol, O.

Abstract

The energy transition requires massive and costly investments in low-carbon power generation and storage. The private sector, however, is increasingly reluctant to undertake such investments. One of the main reasons is that electricity markets are incomplete: risk-averse investors are facing growing risk factors, but are unable to exchange or mitigate these risks beyond a few years. Hybrid market designs, by adding Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms, Contracts for Difference (CfDs), Power Purchase Agreements, and other financial instruments to the energy spot market, allow a better risk allocation between market agents, and have been shown to efficiently foster investment in new generators. Few studies have, however, quantified their efficiency in future systems with a high penetration of both renewable and storage technologies. The present paper tries to fill this research gap. We first propose to generalize the concept of Financial CfDs introduced in the literature to all assets, including storage and consumption assets, into what we define as Financial Twins: financial contracts that fully replicate physical asset’s profits. We then show that a hybrid market design with one Financial Twin per technology is optimal in a power economy: it allows to reach the first best welfare, risk allocation, and investment decisions. To do so, we develop a two-stage stochastic partial equilibrium model of a power system in which agents invest in the first stage in an uncertain environment before trading electricity in the spot market in the second stage. After formulating the model and deriving some useful properties of Financial Twins, we apply the model to the Spanish electricity market to quantify the combined impacts of various Financial Twins in a real-world situation. We also propose and successfully apply a methodology to rank their added value by computing their Shapley values. Our findings indicate that Financial Twins for generators and demand have a far higher value than those for storage. Since over-the-counter battery contracts can already hedge most of a project’s lifetime, policy makers should thus focus on ensuring adequate hedging for more critical technologies through well-designed Financial Twins.

Suggested Citation

  • Soumoy, L. & Abada, I. & Ehrenmann, A. & Massol, O., 2025. "Financial Twins: Adapting Long-term Contract Designs to new Electricity Systems," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2582, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:2582
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/publication-cwpe-pdfs/cwpe2582.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Newbery, 2023. "Efficient Renewable Electricity Support: Designing an Incentive-compatible Support Scheme," The Energy Journal, , vol. 44(3), pages 1-22, May.
    2. Abada, I. & Ehrenmann, A., 2025. "Mitigating Market Incompleteness with Minor Market Distortions: The Case of Negative Spot Prices For Electricity," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2525, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Mastropietro, Paolo & Rodilla, Pablo & Rivier, Michel & Batlle, Carlos, 2024. "Reliability options: Regulatory recommendations for the next generation of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    4. de Vries, Laurens & Heijnen, Petra, 2008. "The impact of electricity market design upon investment under uncertainty: The effectiveness of capacity mechanisms," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 215-227, September.
    5. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    6. Downward, Anthony & Young, David & Zakeri, Golbon, 2016. "Electricity retail contracting under risk-aversion," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(3), pages 846-859.
    7. Waidelich, Paul & Krug, Joscha & Steffen, Bjarne, 2025. "Mobilizing credit for clean energy: De-risking and public loan provision under learning spillovers," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    8. Hendrik Bessembinder & Michael L. Lemmon, 2002. "Equilibrium Pricing and Optimal Hedging in Electricity Forward Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1347-1382, June.
    9. Lebeau, Alexis & Petitet, Marie & Quemin, Simon & Saguan, Marcelo, 2024. "Long-term issues with the Energy-Only Market design in the context of deep decarbonization," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    10. repec:aen:journl:ej44-3-newbery is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Shu, Han & Mays, Jacob, 2023. "Beyond capacity: Contractual form in electricity reliability obligations," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    12. Joskow, Paul L., 2008. "Capacity payments in imperfect electricity markets: Need and design," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 159-170, September.
    13. Hart, Oliver D., 1975. "On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 418-443, December.
    14. Ibrahim Abada & Andreas Ehrenmann, 2025. "Mitigating market incompleteness with minor market distortions: the case of negative spot prices for electricity," Working Papers EPRG2507, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    15. Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 2002. "Theory of Incomplete Markets, Volume 1," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262632543, December.
    16. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    17. Ibrahim Abada & Julien Ancel, 2025. "Capacity investment decisions in equilibrium: a distributionally robust approach," Post-Print hal-05191310, HAL.
    18. Schweppe, Fred C., 1988. "Management of a spot price based energy marketplace," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 359-368, August.
    19. Philippe Artzner & Freddy Delbaen & Jean‐Marc Eber & David Heath, 1999. "Coherent Measures of Risk," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 203-228, July.
    20. Schlecht, Ingmar & Maurer, Christoph & Hirth, Lion, 2024. "Financial contracts for differences: The problems with conventional CfDs in electricity markets and how forward contracts can help solve them," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    21. Ibrahim Abada & Julien Ancel, 2025. "Capacity investment decisions in equilibrium: a distributionally robust approach," Grenoble Ecole de Management (Post-Print) hal-05191310, HAL.
    22. RALPH, Daniel & SMEERS, Yves, 2015. "Risk trading and endogenous probabilities in investment equilibria," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2727, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    23. Willems, Bert & Morbee, Joris, 2010. "Market completeness: How options affect hedging and investments in the electricity sector," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 786-795, July.
    24. repec:aen:eeepjl:2_2_a02 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Benth, Fred Espen & Koekebakker, Steen, 2008. "Stochastic modeling of financial electricity contracts," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 1116-1157, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Louis Soumoy & Ibrahim Abada & Andreas Ehrenmann & Olivier Massol, 2025. "Financial twins: adapting long-term contract designs to new electricity systems," Working Papers EPRG2525, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    2. Shu, Han & Mays, Jacob, 2023. "Beyond capacity: Contractual form in electricity reliability obligations," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    3. Han Shu & Jacob Mays, 2022. "Beyond capacity: contractual form in electricity reliability obligations," Papers 2210.10858, arXiv.org.
    4. Lebeau, Alexis & Petitet, Marie & Quemin, Simon & Saguan, Marcelo, 2024. "Long-term issues with the Energy-Only Market design in the context of deep decarbonization," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    5. Sanchez Jimenez, I. & Bruninx, K. & de Vries, L.J., 2025. "Capacity remuneration mechanisms for decarbonized power systems," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 391(C).
    6. Abuzayed, A., 2025. "From Model Optimality to Market Reality: Do Electricity Markets Support Renewable Investments?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2558, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Lo Prete, Chiara & Palmer, Karen & Robertson, Molly, 2024. "Time for a Market Upgrade? A Review of Wholesale Electricity Market Designs for the Future," RFF Reports 24-09, Resources for the Future.
    8. Anas Abuzayed, 2025. "From model optimality to market reality: do electricity markets support renewable investments?," Working Papers EPRG2521, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    9. Lo Prete, Chiara & Palmer, Karen & Robertson, Molly, 2025. "Time for a market upgrade? A review of wholesale electricity market designs for the future," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    10. Iman Khajepour & Geoffrey Pritchard & Danny Ralph & Golbon Zakeri, 2025. "On monotone completion of risk markets: Limit results for incomplete risk markets," Papers 2504.18436, arXiv.org.
    11. Keppler, Jan Horst & Quemin, Simon & Saguan, Marcelo, 2022. "Why the sustainable provision of low-carbon electricity needs hybrid markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    12. Russo, Marianna & Bertsch, Valentin, 2020. "A looming revolution: Implications of self-generation for the risk exposure of retailers," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    13. Michael Ferris & Andy Philpott, 2022. "Dynamic Risked Equilibrium," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(3), pages 1933-1952, May.
    14. Tegnér, Martin & Ernstsen, Rune Ramsdal & Skajaa, Anders & Poulsen, Rolf, 2017. "Risk-minimisation in electricity markets: Fixed price, unknown consumption," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 423-439.
    15. Woo, C.K. & Chen, Y. & Olson, A. & Moore, J. & Schlag, N. & Ong, A. & Ho, T., 2017. "Electricity price behavior and carbon trading: New evidence from California," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 531-543.
    16. Abada, I. & Ehrenmann, A., 2025. "Mitigating Market Incompleteness with Minor Market Distortions: The Case of Negative Spot Prices For Electricity," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2525, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    17. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2018. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Working Paper Series in Production and Energy 27, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP).
    18. Abada, Ibrahim & Belkhouja, Mustapha & Ehrenmann, Andreas, 2025. "On the valuation of legacy power production in liberalized markets via option-pricing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 322(3), pages 1005-1024.
    19. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2019. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1059-1078.
    20. Ibrahim Abada & Andreas Ehrenmann, 2025. "Mitigating market incompleteness with minor market distortions: the case of negative spot prices for electricity," Working Papers EPRG2507, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:2582. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jake Dyer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.