Meeting at School. Assortative Matching in Partnerships and Over-Education
This paper argues that assortative matching may explain over-education. Education determines individuals' income and, due to the presence of assortative matching, the quality of the partner, who can be a colleague or a spouse. Thus an individual acquires some education to improve the expected partner's quality. But since everybody does that, the partner's quality does not increase and over-education emerges. Tax progression to correct over-education has ambiguous effects on the educational incentives according to the individuals' ability. We test the model using the British Household Panel Survey. The empirical results support our theoretical findings.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Piazza Scaravilli, 2, and Strada Maggiore, 45, 40125 Bologna|
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ana I. Moro Egido & Santiago Budría, 2007.
"Overeducation and Wages in Europe: Evidence from Quantile Regression,"
Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces
E2007/04, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Ana I Moro-Egido & Santiago BudrÌa, "undated". "Overeducation and Wages in Europe: Evidence from Quantile Regression," Studies on the Spanish Economy 229, FEDEA.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp726. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.