Vertical Differentiaiton, Trade and Endogenous Common Standards
Different market settings are considered in a free trade environment, where firms can choose technology, quality, and price of quantity. The shape of competition in prices requires the intervention of governments, via a common antidumping policy, to make firms converge on the simultaneous equilibrium which is socially optimal.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||Jun 1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Motta, Massimo & Thisse, Jacques-Francois & Cabrales, Antonio, 1997.
"On the Persistence of Leadership or Leapfrogging in International Trade,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 809-24, November.
- Massimo MOTTA & Jean-François THISSE & Antonio CABRALES, 1996. "On the Persistence of Leadership or Leapfrogging in International Trade," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9625, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Motta, M. & Thisse,Â J.-F. & Cabrales, A., . "On the persistence of leadership or leapfrogging in international trade," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1287, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Cabrales, Antonio & Motta, Massimo & Thisse, Jacques-François, 1995. "On the Persistence of Leadership or Leapfrogging in International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 1106, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Motta, Massimo, 1992.
"Sunk Costs and Trade Liberalisation,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(412), pages 578-87, May.
- Giulio Ecchia & Luca Lambertini, 1995.
"Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion,"
235, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
- A. Michael Spence, 1975. "Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 417-429, Autumn.
- Boom, Anette, 1995. "Asymmetric International Minimum Quality Standards and Vertical Differentiation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 101-19, March.
- David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1992.
"Duopoly and Quality Standards,"
92.g, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Cahiers de recherche 9128, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Cahiers de recherche 9128, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, 1988. ""Mix and Match": Product Compatibility without Network Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 221-234, Summer.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:263. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Miselli)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Luca Miselli to update the entry or send us the correct address
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.