Convex vNM-Stable Sets for linear production games
We characterize convex vNM-Stable Sets according to von Neumann and Morgenstern for orthogonal linear production games with a continuum of players. The results of Rosenmüller & Shitovitz [International journal of game theory 29 (2000), pp. 39-61] are thereby substantially improved. Simultaneously, this is a corrigendum concerning the proof of a lemma in our first paper.
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- Hart, Sergiu, 1974. "Formation of cartels in large markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 453-466, April.
- Einy, Ezra & Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1996. "Core and Stable Sets of Large Games Arising in Economics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 200-211, January.
- Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590 Elsevier.
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