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Stable Sets for Asymmetric Information Economies

An exchange economy with asymmetrically informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates the information sharing among agents. For it, the notion of stable sets à la Von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different frameworks are taken into account as regards preferences: a model without expectations and a model with expected utility. For the first one, it is shown that the set $V$ of all individually rational, Pareto optimal, symmetric allocations is the unique stable set of symmetric allocations. For the second one, an example is presented which shows that the same set $V$ is not externally stable and a weaker result is proved. Finally, the coalitional incentive compatibility of allocations belonging to the unique stable set is provided.

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Paper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 333.

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Date of creation: 25 Jun 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:333
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  1. Einy, Ezra & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2003. "Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 28-43, April.
  2. Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590 Elsevier.
  3. S. Muto & S. Ishihara & E. Fukuda & S. H. Tijs & R. Brânzei, 2006. "Generalized Cores And Stable Sets For Fuzzy Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 95-109.
  4. Hart, Sergiu, 1974. "Formation of cartels in large markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 453-466, April.
  5. Stefan Maus, 2003. "Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 613-627, October.
  6. Anesi, Vincent, 2010. "Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 488-493, November.
  7. Faro, José Heleno, 2012. "Cobb-Douglas Preferences under Uncertainty," Insper Working Papers wpe_278, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
  8. Stefan Maus, 2004. "Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 395-418, August.
  9. Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October.
  10. Luciano De Castro & Marialaura Pesce & Nicolas Yannelis, 2011. "Core and Equilibria under ambiguity," Discussion Papers 1534, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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