Stable Sets for Asymmetric Information Economies
An exchange economy with asymmetrically informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates the information sharing among agents. For it, the notion of stable sets à la Von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different frameworks are taken into account as regards preferences: a model without expectations and a model with expected utility. For the first one, it is shown that the set $V$ of all individually rational, Pareto optimal, symmetric allocations is the unique stable set of symmetric allocations. For the second one, an example is presented which shows that the same set $V$ is not externally stable and a weaker result is proved. Finally, the coalitional incentive compatibility of allocations belonging to the unique stable set is provided.
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