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Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core

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  • Stefan Maus

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Abstract

A replica theorem is shown to hold for exchange economies with asymmetric information. In a replicated exchange economy with asymmetric information the set of all core elements with equal treatment is nonempty, but it is in general only a subset of the core. Nevertheless, the replica theorem and the presence of at least one core element with equal treatment suffice to show existence of a competitive quasi-equilibrium. Conditions on the initial endowments and the communication system are given to ensure that every competitive quasi-equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Maus, 2004. "Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 395-418, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:24:y:2004:i:2:p:395-418
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0416-x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Basile, Achille & Donnini, Chiara & Graziano, Maria Gabriella, 2009. "Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3-4), pages 293-307, March.
    2. Carlos Hervés-Beloso & V. Martins-da-Rocha & Paulo Monteiro, 2009. "Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 295-320, February.
    3. Achille Basile & Chiara Donnini & Maria Graziano, 2010. "Economies with informational asymmetries and limited vetoer coalitions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(1), pages 147-180, October.
    4. Maria Gabriella Graziano & Claudia Meo & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2015. "Stable sets for asymmetric information economies," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 137-154, March.
    5. Guadalupe Fugarolas-Alvarez-Ude & Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Emma Moreno-García & Juan Torres-Martínez, 2009. "A market game approach to differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 321-330, February.
    6. Claudia Meo, 2009. "Existence of Edgeworth equilibria for economies with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 371-383, February.
    7. Marta Faias & Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Emma Moreno-García, 2011. "Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 205-218, September.
    8. Sun, Yeneng & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2007. "Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 131-155, October.
    9. Anuj Bhowmik & Jiling Cao, 2017. "Ex-post core, fine core and rational expectations equilibrium allocations," Papers 1703.08807, arXiv.org.
    10. Claudia Meo, 2015. "Cooperative Solutions for Large Economies with Asymmetric Information," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 71-90, February.

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