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Masking Redistribution (or its Absence)

Author

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  • Jonathan Baron
  • Edward McCaffery

    (USC and Caltech)

Abstract

Research has shown that people vary widely in their support or opposition to progressive taxation. We argue here that the perception of progressiveness itself is affected by the nature of the tax system and by the way it is framed, or presented. Experiments conducted over the World-Wide Web and using within-subject design demonstrate that subjects suffer from a range of heuristics and biases in understanding and supporting progressive or redistributive taxation. After reviewing some prior results, we report three new studies. Two of them indicate that people do not sufficiently appreciate the reduction of progressiveness that results from the use of tax deductions to partly reimburse private expenditures. The third indicates that people do not fully appreciate the reduction in progressiveness that results from cuts in government services.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Baron & Edward McCaffery, "undated". "Masking Redistribution (or its Absence)," University of Southern California Legal Working Paper Series usclwps-1000, University of Southern California Law School.
  • Handle: RePEc:bep:usclwp:usclwps-1000
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    File URL: http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=usclwps
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J. & Johnston, Rachel M., 2005. "An experimental test of the crowding out hypothesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1543-1560, August.
    2. McCaffery, Edward J. & Baron, Jonathan, 2003. "The Humpty Dumpty blues: Disaggregation bias in the evaluation of tax systems," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 230-242, July.
    3. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    4. Read, Daniel & Loewenstein, George & Rabin, Matthew, 1999. "Choice Bracketing," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 171-197, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lucy F. Ackert & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2004. "Tax policy design in the presence of social preferences: some experimental evidence," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2004-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    2. Lars Osberg, 2019. "Could "Equality of Opportunity" among Commoners Suffice?," Working Papers daleconwp2019-01, Dalhousie University, Department of Economics.
    3. Lars Osberg & Insa Bechert, 2016. "Social values for equality and preferences for state intervention: Is the USA “Exceptional”?," Working Papers daleconwp2016-03, Dalhousie University, Department of Economics.
    4. Mihai Mutascu, 2012. "Taxation under media capture," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 2752-2767.
    5. Lucy F. Ackert & Jorge Martinez‐Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2007. "Social Preferences And Tax Policy Design: Some Experimental Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 487-501, July.

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