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Medical Malpractice and Contract Disclosure: An Equilibrium Model of the Effects of Legal Rules on Behavior in Health Care Markets

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  • Kathryn Zeiler

    (Georgetown University Law Center)

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  • Kathryn Zeiler, "undated". "Medical Malpractice and Contract Disclosure: An Equilibrium Model of the Effects of Legal Rules on Behavior in Health Care Markets," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1071, American Law & Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:bep:alecam:1071
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
    2. Browne, Mark J & Puelz, Robert, 1999. "The Effect of Legal Rules on the Value of Economic and Non-economic Damages and the Decision to File," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 189-213, August.
    3. Louis Kaplow, 1993. "Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 625-630, Winter.
    4. Blomqvist, Ake, 1991. "The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 411-432.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Bernardo, Antonio E & Talley, Eric & Welch, Ivo, 2000. "A Theory of Legal Presumptions," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-49, April.
    7. Hylton, Keith N., 1990. "The influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 161-171, September.
    8. Danzon, Patricia M., 1985. "Liability and liability insurance for medical malpractice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 309-331, December.
    9. Dolan, Paul, 2000. "The measurement of health-related quality of life for use in resource allocation decisions in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 32, pages 1723-1760, Elsevier.
    10. Danzon, Patricia M., 2000. "Liability for medical malpractice," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 26, pages 1339-1404, Elsevier.
    11. Farley, Pamela J., 1986. "Theories of the price and quantity of physician services : A synthesis and critique," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 315-333, December.
    12. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-1097, September.
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