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Riesgo de balance en los bancos centrales: el papel del capital y las estrategias para preservarlo

Author

Listed:
  • Lina Fernanda Torres-Gutierrez
  • Edwin Mauricio Parra-Rodriguez
  • Julian Andres Gomez-Duran
  • Gonzalo Ignacio Ossa-Stipcianos
  • Egberto Alexander Riveros-Saavedra
  • Juan Sebastián Rojas-Moreno
  • Alvaro José Martinez-Monroy

Abstract

This paper analyses the role of capital in Central Banks (CBs), the implications for the effectiveness of economic policy objectives, and the strategies employed to preserve capital levels. Based on a review of literature and cases of CBs that have presented scenarios of considerable losses and capital impairment, the evidence suggests that the financial soundness of CBs may be a necessary condition for achieving their policy objectives, as it can impact their various transmission channels, through agents' expectations and public confidence. In this sense, a negative shock on these channels can compromise CBs' credibility and financial autonomy. However, there are cases of CBs that, despite having negative capital levels, have managed to be effective in implementing their policies, given that they have mitigating factors such as government fiscal support, solid legal and institutional frameworks, and stable financial systems. In this regard, the case of the Banco de la República is analyzed. It was found that it has a legal framework that grants it financial, technical, and administrative autonomy, and that it also has mechanisms or strategies that have allowed it to maintain a solid financial position and preserve its capital levels. These mechanisms include the mandate to distribute profits/losses with the government, the possibility of establishing reserves in equity, and institutional strength, among others. *****RESUMEN: El objetivo de este documento es analizar el rol del capital en los bancos centrales (BC), las implicaciones sobre la efectividad de los objetivos de política económica y las estrategias empleadas para preservar los niveles de capital. Para esto, se realizó una revisión de la literatura y de casos de BC que han presentado escenarios de pérdidas considerables y de deterioro de su capital. La evidencia sugiere que la solidez financiera de los BC puede ser una condición necesaria para el logro de sus objetivos de política en la medida en que puede impactar sus diferentes canales de transmisión, a través de las expectativas de los agentes y la confianza del público. En este sentido, un choque negativo sobre estos canales puede comprometer la credibilidad y la autonomía financiera de los BC. No obstante, existen casos de BC que, aun teniendo niveles de capital negativo, han logrado ser efectivos en la implementación de sus políticas, dado que cuentan con factores mitigantes como el apoyo fiscal del gobierno, marcos legales e institucionales sólidos y sistemas financieros estables. En este sentido, se analiza el caso del Banco de la República, para el cual se halló que cuenta con un marco legal que le otorga autonomía financiera, técnica y administrativa, y que además dispone de mecanismos o estrategias que le han permitido mantener una posición financiera sólida y preservar sus niveles de capital. Dentro de estos mecanismos se destacan el mandato de distribución de utilidades/pérdidas con el gobierno, la posibilidad de constitución de reservas en el patrimonio y la fortaleza institucional, entre otros.

Suggested Citation

  • Lina Fernanda Torres-Gutierrez & Edwin Mauricio Parra-Rodriguez & Julian Andres Gomez-Duran & Gonzalo Ignacio Ossa-Stipcianos & Egberto Alexander Riveros-Saavedra & Juan Sebastián Rojas-Moreno & Alvar, 2025. "Riesgo de balance en los bancos centrales: el papel del capital y las estrategias para preservarlo," Borradores de Economia 1314, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:1314
    DOI: 10.32468/be.1314
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capital del banco central; solidez financiera de un banco central; política monetaria; credibilidad; independencia; mitigación de riesgos; apoyo fiscal; buffers de capital; Central Bank Capital; Financial soundness of central Banks; Monetary Policy; Credibility; Independence; Risk Mitigation; Fiscal support; Capital buffers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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